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Book Review
The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms, by Margaret Boden. 2nd edition. Routledge, London and
New York, 2004; 344 pp. including bibliography, index, figures and line drawings; preface xi-xii. ISBN
0-415-31452-6 hbk., $100.00; ISBN 0-415-31453-4 pbk., $27.96.
The Creative Mind is a lively, wide-ranging, accessible discussion of human creativity and how
computers can help us understand it. First published in l990, the second edition (2004) adds an
introductory ten-page overview of Boden’s position (“In A Nutshell”) and an Epilogue surveying recent
developments, such as new programs for musical composition, architectural design, drawing, proving
mathematical theorems, and connectionist networks that can be evolved rather than designed. The one
significant change in the body of the book is the added discussion of Douglas Hofstadter’s analogy
program, COPYCAT.
Boden’s basic position, then, is unchanged from the first edition. She is well aware that many
readers will doubt or flatly deny that computers can tell us anything about creativity, on grounds
that they have no purposes, desires, or values, and can do nothing but what their human
programmer tells them to. This was the view of one Lady Lovelace, and Boden responds to such
broadsides by distinguishing what she calls the four “Lovelace questions”: 1) Can computational
concepts help us to understand human creativity?; 2) Could a computer (now or in the future)
appear to be creative?; 3) Could a computer ever appear to recognize creativity?; 4) Could a
computer ever really be creative? She is inclined to answer ‘no’ to the last question, which she
considers a complex philosophical issue rather than a matter of empirical investigation (Ch. 12). But
most of the book concerns the first three questions, and above all the first, to all of which she
answers ‘yes’. Her primary concern is to demonstrate that, and specifically how, our thoughts about
human creativity, as difficult as they may be to make clear and as tempting as it can be to cast them
in the form of suggestive but vague metaphors, can to a large extent be rendered precise and
testable by formulating them in computational terms and implementing them in functioning
computer programs. Moreover, two facts lend credibility to the notion that computational theories
such as Boden’s really are theories of human creativity and not just accounts of the achievements of
fancy mechanical devices: a) relatively recent connectionist programs have a degree of
psychological and neural plausibility far beyond that of earlier, linear computer programs, and b)
specific programs in a wide variety of domains have been able to mimic ever more impressively
both the products and (arguably) some of the processes manifest in human creativity.
More specifically, Boden’s argument that computational concepts can help us understand creativity
begins by distinguishing three basic types of creativity: (i) (re)combination of familiar items within
some domain to form new ones; (ii) exploration of an established conceptual space to discover new
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and perhaps quite unexpected possibilities within that space; (iii) transformation of a conceptual
space itself to arrive at things (ideas, artifacts, etc.) that were not even possible within the earlier
space. (She also distinguishes P-creativity from H-creativity: a valuable idea is P-creative if the
person who produced it could not have done so before; it is H-creative if, in addition, no one has
ever produced that idea before. But the latter question involves historical issues and is not a major
concern of the book, which is in effect about the more basic notion of P-creativity.) Although
Boden notes more than once that genuine creativity of any sort must produce not mere novelties,
but novelties that are of some interest or value, her focus throughout is on computational aspects of
the topic. In keeping with that approach, Boden finds the familiar metaphor of “conceptual space”
apt but vague; reformulated in more precise computational terms the most striking instances of
creativity can be said to involve results that, relative to some previously established system or
structured style of thought or production, could not possibly have arisen: they were computationally
impossible, and became possible only through a change in the principles or rules of the underlying
generative, computational system itself.
Boden is quite sympathetic toward other approaches, and discusses (Chs 1, 2) some classical
theories of creativity (e.g., Poincare’s four stages of a) preliminary conscious work, b) non-
conscious incubation, c) conscious insight, and d) evaluative work, or Koestler’s theory of
bisociation of matrices), along with such oft-told tales of creativity as Coleridge’s imagery in Kubla
Khan or Kekule’s discovery of the cyclical structure of benzene rings, of which she gives an
unusually detailed and instructive account. She finds much of value in these accounts and attempts
in Chapters 3-6 to incorporate what is useful in them (and especially in Koestler’s main idea) into a
computational theory of creativity. Fundamentally this requires postulating for each domain
considered an underlying set of computational principles that define a space of possibilities (like a
set of grammatical rules defining an infinite space of grammatical sentences or the rules of chess
defining infinitely many legal moves). On this basis one can view instances of creativity as the
result of explorations or transformations of that space, or simply new combinations of familiar
elements within that space.
The most urgent question about the most striking form of creativity (“transformational”) is that of
how the mind could possibly manage to transform its own conceptual space so as to go beyond
what was even possible before. Boden’s answer (Ch. 4) draws on the developmental psychologist
Annette Karmaloff-Smith’s notion of “representational redescription”. Roughly, this is our capacity
to represent explicitly and in detail activities that had previously been carried out as an implicitly
represented routine (e.g., the motor routines involved in riding a bike, or a four-year-old’s largely
implicit representation of how to draw a human being)—and subsequently, to re-represent those
representations, and so on to higher levels of representation. Forming explicit representations of our
own representations allows us to explore or transform them, and thereby to alter fundamentally our
thought or action. (It may be noted in passing that the question of how we are able to formulate
maps of our own conceptual spaces is not itself explored.) Some present-day computer programs do
in fact include representations of their own procedures, and can on that basis alter those procedures.
One may describe associative, exploratory, and transformative creativity either in “classical” or
connectionist style networks (Ch. 5), and Boden discusses a wide array of actual computational
programs implementing various instances of creativity (Ch.6-8)—e.g., the discovery and
interpretation of analogies, musical composition, discovery or proof of mathematical theorems,
Essays in Philosophy - Book Review
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/pattersonrev.html[9/18/2009 5:09:16 PM]
formulation of hypotheses in organic chemistry, story telling, composition of haikus, musical
improvisation, etc. Here connectionist or PDP (parallel distributed processing) models suggest how
the mind is able to go beyond the “cut and paste” combining of ideas to produce a merging or
blending of old ideas in a new structure. (One might hope that a future edition will apply this
important idea to the familiar contest between associationistic and organic/“genius” theories of
literary creativity, since one major claim of the later—as propounded by Goethe, Coleridge, and
others—was precisely that true creativity was not a “brick and mortar” or merely combinational
process, but brought together and transformed old ideas into something more radically new.) A
further interesting implication of all this is that the generation of creative ideas in the arts takes
place in the same basic way(s) as in the sciences.
These discussions range from the interesting to the fascinating, and are in general presented with
admirable lucidity. (One possible exception: the explanation of connectionism itself is perhaps a bit
too breezy.) In some domains, such as drawing, generating rules for analyzing organic molecules, or
diagnosing soybean diseases (this is not so easy!), the results have been impressive; in others, such
as storytelling, results have been very limited or even comically bad (e.g., early TALE-SPIN’s story
of Henry Ant and Bill Bird). But even here much progress has been made, and the attempt to figure
out how computers might better spin a tale has generated interesting ideas about how the mind
might in fact represent human emotion, motivation and action. Probably most impressive are
programs that can “train themselves up” or even “evolve” by changing their own ground rules or
heuristics—either in light of evaluations of results provided from outside, or in accord with built-in
principles of evaluation, or randomly. Such programs (e.g., “EURISKO”, or the mighty “ID3
algorithm”) have achieved impressive results in art, mathematics and science, and should be taken
into consideration by anyone who is tempted to simply assume that computers “can only do what
they are told to do.” Although the question of whether even these programs are genuinely creative
is complex and controversial, they support Boden’s primary claim that by generating, clarifying,
and putting into practice a range of substantial ideas about creativity--including the reflexive
mapping of thought, evaluation of ideas, and transformation of conceptual spaces--a computational
approach can be extremely helpful in thinking about human creativity.
The remaining chapters move quickly through a series of interesting but less central questions.
Chapter 9 argues that a scientific account of creativity need not imply either determinism or
predictability (nor, as chaos theory shows, does determinism entail predictability-by-humans), and
discusses a number of important ways in which chance or random or serendipitous factors can enter
into creativity in combination with constraints, where the latter remain central to creativity. Chapter
10 defends the view that creativity is neither a single nor special capacity, but an aspect of
intelligence in general, involving a host of familiar abilities (memory, perception, noticing,
comparing, etc.). Cases of exceptional genius (Mozart) are not yet understood, but might well
involve unusual enhancement of some perfectly common capacity such as short term memory,
whose enlargement can demonstrably have a major impact on the achievements of computer
programs, including those for musical improvisation. A final chapter (apart from the Epilogue)
considers various possible reasons for answering ‘no’ to the fourth Lovelace question, “Can
computers really be creative?” All of these arguments apply to intelligence in general, not just to
creativity in particular; for example, creativity requires consciousness, and computers cannot be
conscious; computers are all syntax and no semantics, so that their symbols and operations are all
meaningless to them. Boden finds these arguments inconclusive and points out that even if accepted
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they would in no way call for a negative answer to the other three Lovelace questions. The last
portion of the Chapter addresses fears that the scientific explanation of creativity would
“dehumanize” it, dispelling its beauty and mystery, and our awe. Livingston Lowes’ remark on his
own study of Coleridge’s imagery, quoted by Boden and applied to creativity in general, seems a
sufficient answer: “I am not forgetting beauty. It is because the worth of beauty is transcendent that
the subtle ways of the power that achieves it are transcendently worth searching out.”
Of course, a further mark of a useful approach is that it stimulates useful questions, including any
about its own limits or plausibility. We close with a few such questions about Boden’s
computational framework itself, and about the role of affective/emotional/aesthetic factors in
creativity. (We make no distinctions in this review among such factors.) First, with regard to any
purported computational system or structured style of thought, we would add to the four Lovelace
questions the question posed by R. Crumb’s creation, Boingy Baxter: “Is dis a system?” For as
Boden points out, the theory has no application to a given activity (story-telling, divination,
mathematics) unless that activity is engaged in by humans on the basis of computationally
expressible principles or rules. But it is also worth emphasizing that this is not guaranteed by the
fact that it or its products can be described (as opposed to actually being generated) in a rule-based
way. Further, even if some activity is in part rule-generated, it may involve other factors (e.g.,
chance, randomness, serendipity, as discussed in Boden’s Ch. 9) that are not; and it may be that the
interaction of computational and non-computational processes is the core of at least some types of
creativity. In such cases a computational description could take us only to the threshold of
creativity.
Pressing the issue further, Boingy will also want to ask, “Even supposing this is a system, how do
we know we have correctly identified its true underlying principles?” With regard to Boden’s
example of Western tonal music, different styles of structural analysis are available. Is there any one
correct system, either musically or psychologically, for the structural analysis of this sort of music?
Boden points to Longuet-Higgens’ formal description of a conceptual space of musical keys and
their relationships (and mentions elsewhere his study of factors involved in expressive
performance). Clearly many features, including harmonic structure, melody, rhythm, dynamics, and
timbre, will interact in critical ways to produce music. Fred Lehrdahl and Ray Jackendoff’s A
Generative Theory of Tonal Music (MIT, l983) is an admirable attempt to come to grips with much
of this complexity; other highly sophisticated systems of musical analysis exist as well. But even if
we consider simply the structural analysis of music, how do we know when we have identified the
right one for purposes of understanding musical creativity—again, assuming there is a right one?
Lehrdahl and Jackendoff’s work derives from “Schenker analysis”, whereas others favor a type of
approach pioneered by Schoenberg; and David Epstein (Beyond Orpheus, Oxford, l987) proposes a
kind of synthesis of the two. Of course what one needs for a theory of creativity is not just a
coherent way to construe music (Milton Babbett’s term), but a musical analysis that provides a
plausible and reasonably detailed psychological representation of the (perhaps implicit) principles in
accordance with which it is composed. But as soon as we get beyond the barest essentials, where
are we to find confirmation of one type of analysis rather than another? From an empirical point of
view a crucial question will be whether one system rather than another leads to distinctive, testable
predictions about how composers compose, as well as about what they can compose relative to that
system. At present, computer programs can at least give us some information about what does or
can happen in simple situations, and about how programs can be made more sophisticated and their
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products more interesting. But when we approach the level of real-world complexity, what more can
we say than that many extant systems of tonal music analysis are consistent with the same musical
“surface” (e.g., the score of a Mozart symphony); and what can we really say about whether that
surface was actually produced on the basis of one system rather than another? Similar questions will
arise with regard to creativity in most if not all domains within the arts and sciences.
Mr. Baxter will also want to know how one is to identify and distinguish between “exploratory”
and “transformative” creativity. One difficulty (noted by Boden) is that there may be a series of
steps between the familiar and the apparently revolutionary, so that the latter seems less like a
fundamental transformation than simply the latest in a series of tweaks. To return to the musical
example, Schoenberg’s change from a traditional tonal system to a twelve-tone one might seem a
clear case of fundamental creative transformation. But as Boden indicates, tonal music became very
highly chromatic, shifting keys often and with great freedom as regards key relationships, before
Schoenberg (and in Schoenberg’s early work as well). So did he just take the final step in the
process of relaxing traditional key relationships, and is his twelve-tone system not so radically
creative after all? Put the other way round, we could describe in principle any advances by Classical
or Romantic or Expressionist composers toward tonal freedom as changes in previous rules or
constraints, and thus as a series of transformations. It’s just a matter of expressing changes in
compositional practices as changes in underlying rules. Here perhaps the depth of the principles
involved will save the day. This remains to be seen, however, and depends at a minimum on
finding and establishing in detail the hierarchical properties of the right generative system.
Another option would be to respond that twelve-tone composition does not simply remove
traditional constraints, but imposes new rules of its own, e.g., that each tone in the “row” must be
sounded before any are repeated--a rule Schoenberg himself honored in the breach as well as the
observance. This would raise the more general question of whether transformational creativity
requires the introduction of new rules, or whether it can consist simply in dropping some basic
constraint(s)—or both. Perhaps it would be best to say that these represent three interestingly
different sorts of transformation, all of which make possible what had previously been
computationally impossible. But it is far from evident that this would make possible a tolerably
clear distinction between tweaks, explorations, and transformations. After all, some additions to the
rules will be relatively trivial. So we may find ourselves returning to the criterion of depth, and to
the problem of specifying and justifying a particular hierarchical system.
Meanwhile the question would remain of whether the distinction between an exploration and a
transformation—or for that matter, between either of those and a combinational novelty--will give
us even a rough measure of creativity. Could a Mozartean tweak be more creative than the latest
modernist revolutionary transformation (complete with manifesto)? If so, perhaps the criterion of
value or interest (duly recognized by Boden) should not be regarded simply as one requirement for
admission to candidacy, as it were, with computational distinctions then determining which things
of value are genuinely creative and in what way; perhaps creativity is more centrally the creation of
value or beauty or interest or the like, and different sorts of computational innovation are important
instruments of such creation, and tweaks can sometimes be more valuable and creative than
transformations.
The case of twelve-tone music might suggest that yet a further, phenomenological, sort of criterion
of creativity is at work, one having to do simply with the way a piece sounds (or a painting looks,
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etc.). Suppose for a moment that neither the computational nor the evaluative criterion justifies our
distinguishing between a chromatic tweak (of romantic music) and the twelve-tone transformation
(of chromatic music), and yet listeners and composers alike tend to experience the later but not the
former as a radically creative break with its musical past. Perhaps this is a case in which a major
change in auditory gestalt results from a change in underlying principles of composition that are,
from a computational point of view, not proportionately great. In fact the question can be applied to
any two transitions: possibly the change in psychological impression produced by a new style in
music or painting will be much more (or less) radical than the changes in the underlying generative
principles that made the new style computationally possible. Of course even if the two sorts of
change are found (through psychological experimentation?) to be directly proportional, it would
complicate the account of creativity considerably to include the factor of audience response. And if
we did, would this set artistic creativity apart from the mathematical and scientific, at least in one
significant respect?
But even if we decline to bring in the audience we may want to consider a further psychological
criterion on the side of the creator (composer, mathematician, painter, physicist, etc.), namely, the
strength of the psychological entrenchment of a set of rules, or the power of the hold it has on the
creator’s thought or imagination. The last hundred years have seen a great many “revolutionary”
changes, and once the artistic community gets used to the fact of such change, transformative
innovations can seem unimpressively easy, even normal. Each new revolutionary is just doing the
same thing as everybody else—“making it new”, as they say in the modern theater. And yet in
terms of altering computational possibilities to produce something of value, each new
“breakthrough” may be just as transformative as that of the first great, and truly revolutionary,
revolutionary. But he or she had to do something much more difficult and, we may be inclined to
say, more genuinely creative, than those who came after. Only that pioneering effort is, as Boingy
would put it, “in the realm of great achievements”.
Further, we note that so long as the older and newer generative styles or systems have something
basic in common, there will always be a clear sense in which they are both versions of a more
fundamental system. So perhaps one ought really to view them in that way rather than by seeing the
second as a transformation of the first. Or perhaps better yet would be to view them in both ways.
This is not a merely logical possibility: Anton Webern, the strictest of the “big three” Viennese
twelve-tone composers, argued precisely that twelve-tone music was based on the same fundamental
principles of composition as a Bach cantata. (Webern, The Path to the New Music, Theodore
Presser Co., l953). A computational approach might be able to help us describe clearly the way in
which different systems overlap; but how could it tell us whether twelve-tone music was a radical
break with the tonal past or, as Webern argued, constituted at bottom a different development of the
same root principles and just appeared on the surface to be radically different? And in the latter sort
of case, should we regard both the older tonal system and the serial system as creative
developments of a more fundamental system—developments achieved neither by the latter altering
or dropping some rules of the former (even if describable in that way), nor by either system
changing or dropping any of the more fundamental common principles, but in each case through
specification of additional, more specific, rules within a shared underlying framework of very
elementary principles (e.g., both are built on a foundation of twelve consecutive half-steps, both
aim largely at the creation of tension and release, both employ structural repetition, extension,
inversion, alteration, etc.). A computational approach can certainly help us formulate any
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computational principles involved in dealing with such issues, but cannot by itself tell us which
description is musically or psychologically correct.
A further challenge arising from within the computational framework itself is that however we
modify an older system to arrive at a new one, we would like our account of the process to reveal
the nature of the constraints (if any) on our selection of initial principles to be dropped, altered,
replaced, or added, and on any changes we make. The way in which we represent and re-represent
the relevant rules will be a critical factor, but presumably that representation will be equally
consistent with a range of potential changes without explaining the occurrence of any one change in
particular. Then, too, one will want to know whether these constraints are themselves best described
computationally—and whether they are themselves activated or guided by further computational
processes. This will surely cause Boingy to wonder, “Where does the ascent through levels of
constraints stop?”
We close with a question concerned more directly with the apparently non-computational factors
that keep cropping up. Boden focuses on what she sees as the cognitive/computational basis of
creativity, but she clearly acknowledges the role of further factors—principally, that creativity must
produce something of value or interest—and touches occasionally on accounts giving a substantial
role to emotion or aesthetic sensibility. But it may be that these other factors should be given a
larger or sometimes even central role. Through the persona of a Priestess of certain Higher
Mysteries (Diotima in the Symposium), Plato speaks of a passion for “(pro)creation” in beauty—
whether of beautiful mathematical theories, civic constitutions, epic poems, or philosophy; this, she
says, is a great motivator of creativity. But in addition to providing motivation, aesthetic judgments
might be involved more essentially in the creative process itself. Poincare (quoted by Boden)
describes the conscious “aesthetic sensibility” of the geometer or other creative person as noticing,
among the many combinations of ideas proffered by the unconscious mind, certain particularly
harmonious and hence potentially fruitful ones. (This is the third stage in Poincare’s theory, that of
“insight”.) Whatever one thinks of Poincare’s own development of the notion, other mathematicians
and scientists have spoken of being guided by aesthetic perception of beauty and elegance in a
theory as a whole or in a particular proof. Einstein’s search for a “beautiful” unified theory in
physics is perhaps the most widely known example, but there are many others, including the
ultimate creator, who, we are told, paused after each step in his creative work to see “that it was
good”. So we have a kind of aesthetic/affective judge at work, as well as a motivator.
The point is more obvious and can easily be pressed further in the fine arts. Aaron Copeland
describes much of his own compositional experience as involving at every step a combination of a
rather intuitive production of ideas with “critical-aesthetic” judgment. (Music and the Imagination,
1952) The phrase ‘at every step’ suggests a more thoroughgoing and co-equal role for affect and/or
aesthetic sensibility. Such a role might be intermittent, alternating temporally with more
straightforwardly computational processes. But an interestingly different possibility would be that of
a more or less continuous aesthetic monitoring of one’s work and a shepherding of its progress
toward an aesthetic goal. Something along these lines is in effect suggested by J.S. Mill (in “What
is Poetry?”), who thought of emotion as exercising an organizing and unifying influence over more
simply associative processes involved in artistic creativity. Here the emotional factor is involved
not just in the “why” but also the “how” of the creative process: without it, the result would not
achieve the integration or unity essential to its being a worthwhile work of art. But in principle the
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relationship between aesthetic or emotional apprehension and computational processes may
sometimes be even closer than that, amounting to a fusion of the two, such that for at least some
stages of the creative process it would be wrong to suppose that these factors retain their own
identities, psychologically or neurally. In sum, there are a number of ways in which affect or
aesthetic judgment might well play a major role, and even the central role, in the creative process
itself, and which are not in any obvious way captured by a theory of exploration and transformation
of computational spaces.
* * *
None of these questions amounts to an objection to a computational approach, which as Boden
claims can be very helpful in thinking about human creativity. They are posed rather as indicating
directions for further investigation. Perhaps in the end they are all answerable from a broadly
computational perspective. Who knows, perhaps even emotion, aesthetic sensibility and
consciousness may eventually yield to such treatment, and Boden’s three types of creativity will fit
neatly into a comprehensive computational account of the human mind. But if so, that day is not yet
at hand.
Richard Patterson
Katherine Thomas
Emory University
